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INTRODUCTION 
One of the most common criticisms of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (PPACA)1 is that it constitutes a government 
takeover of America’s health care system.  By this, of course, is meant 
a federal government takeover.  PPACA will certainly increase the fed-
eral government’s presence in health care.  It imposes new federal 
regulations on insurers, creates a new federal program for funding 
health insurance for uninsured middle-income Americans, dramati-
 
† Substantial portions of this Article are based in whole or in part on the author’s 
personal experience as a National Association of Insurance Commissioners consumer 
representative.  
1 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 
119 (2010) (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of 21, 25, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.). 
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cally expands the Medicaid program, and in all likelihood will in-
crease the influence of the Medicare program on the organization of 
the overall health care delivery system. 
Yet PPACA also expands the responsibility and authority of the 
states.  The states, for example, are primarily responsible for enforc-
ing PPACA’s insurance regulatory reforms.2  They are also responsible 
for establishing the exchanges—the entities through which Americans 
will purchase insurance and apply for subsidies3—and for managing 
reinsurance and risk adjustment programs.4  According to the Act, 
states will be responsible for reviewing health insurance premiums 
and for assisting consumers with complaints against their insurers.5 
However, PPACA not only increases the authority of the federal 
and state governments, it also empowers and assigns significant re-
sponsibility to a private agency:  the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners (NAIC).  The NAIC is a private, nonprofit organiza-
tion that has coordinated the activities of the nation’s state and terri-
torial insurance commissioners since 1871.6  Its members are the in-
surance commissioners of the states and territories.7  Traditionally, the 
NAIC has drafted model statutes and regulations for the states, served 
as a clearinghouse for insurance data, and provided a forum for in-
surance commissioners to discuss and address regulatory issues.8 
This Article discusses the role of the NAIC in health care reform.  
It first describes the role of the NAIC in the reforms initiated by PPACA, 
then considers why Congress gave the NAIC significant responsibility 
for health reform, and finally examines how the NAIC has carried out 
 
2 Id. § 1321(a)–(b), 42 U.S.C.A. § 18041(a)–(b) (West Supp. 1B 2010). 
3
See id. 
4 See § 1311(b), 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031(b) (requesting that each state establish an 
“American Health Benefit Exchange” to facilitate the purchase of individual health 
plans and assist small business owners in providing health plans to their employees); 
id. § 1341, 42 U.S.C.A. § 18061 (inviting states to enact reinsurance programs to pro-
vide reinsurance payments to insurance issuers that cover “high-risk individuals”); id. 
§ 1343, 42 U.S.C.A. § 18063 (requesting states to assess a charge on “low actuarial risk 
plans” and provide payment to “high actuarial risk plans”). 
5 See id. sec. 1002, § 2793, 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-93 (West Supp. 1A 2010) (providing 
grants to states for the creation of “independent office[s] of health insurance assis-
tance” to respond to complaints about coverage); id. sec. 1003, § 2794, 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 300gg-94 (inviting states in conjunction with the Secretary of Health and Human Services to 
establish a process for reviewing “unreasonable increases” in insurance premiums). 
6 About the NAIC, NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMMISSIONERS & CENTER FOR INS. POL’Y & 
RES., http://www.naic.org/index_about.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2011). 
7 Id.  
8 Id. 
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these responsibilities.  It contends that Congress found in the NAIC 
not only a very effective partner for involving the states in health care 
reform, but also a vehicle for gaining access to the technical expertise 
and public engagement that is necessary for effective health care 
reform implementation. 
I.  THE NAIC IN THE PATIENT PROTECTION 
AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 
Ten provisions of PPACA refer to the NAIC.9  Several of these sec-
tions require the Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS)—which is primarily responsible for establishing the regula-
tions that will implement PPACA—to consult with the NAIC.  One 
provision, for example, requires HHS to consult with the NAIC in de-
veloping a summary of benefits and a coverage disclosure document;10 
another requires HHS to define permissible age bands by conferring 
with the NAIC;11 yet another requires HHS to work with the NAIC to 
establish regulations to govern compacts for the interstate sale of in-
surance.12  Section 1341 instructs HHS to develop standards in consul-
tation with the NAIC in order to establish an interim reinsurance pro-
gram and mandates that assessments from insurers for funding the 
reinsurance fund be based on NAIC estimates.13  Section 1321—the 
central provision of PPACA that authorizes HHS to implement the Act’s 
insurance market reform provisions—directs HHS to consult with the 
NAIC in establishing regulations to implement the exchanges, qualified 
health plan requirements, risk-adjustment and reinsurance provisions, 
and the regulations that will create the insurances exchanges and other 
insurance reforms of the Act.14 
Other sections of PPACA give the NAIC a more direct role in 
PPACA’s implementation.  The exchanges, for example, must adopt a 
uniform enrollment form that takes into account criteria submitted by 
 
9 See infra notes 10-22. 
10 PPACA sec. 1001(5), § 2715, 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-15. 
11 Id. sec. 1201(4), § 2701(a)(3), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg(a)(3). 
12 Id. § 1333, 42 U.S.C.A. § 18053 (West Supp. 1B 2010). 
13 Id. § 1341(b)(1), (b)(3)(B)(iii), 42 U.S.C.A. § 18061(b)(1), (b)(3)(B)(iii). 
14 See id. § 1321(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 18041(a) (requiring the HHS Secretary to consult 
with the NAIC in implementing regulations of health care exchanges). 
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the NAIC to HHS.15  Another provision requests the NAIC to develop 
model standards and forms for private insurers to use in reporting fraud 
and abuse to state insurance commissioners or other state agencies.16  Yet 
another section requests the NAIC to develop standard methodologies and 
definitions for determining medical-loss ratios.17 
Finally, PPACA incorporates—or requests the NAIC to amend—
existing NAIC model laws.  PPACA, for example, provides that proce-
dures for external review of health plans must include the consumer 
protections in the NAIC Uniform External Review Model Act.18  It also 
instructs HHS to request the NAIC to revise its Medicare Supplement 
insurance standards so as to require at least nominal cost sharing un-
der C and F policies,19 which currently have almost no cost sharing.20 
As implementation of PPACA has proceeded, moreover, the NAIC 
has been given responsibilities even beyond those assigned by the statute 
itself.  HHS has not only consulted with the NAIC to develop the 
summary of benefits and disclosure document, as PPACA requires, but 
has also delegated to the NAIC the responsibility for convening the 
panel of consumers, industry representatives, and regulators responsi-
ble under PPACA for drafting that document.21  The NAIC also devel-
oped at the request of HHS a form for insurers to use in fulfilling the 
obligation PPACA imposes on them to justify unreasonable premium 
increases.22  Finally, the NAIC has continued in its traditional role of 
 
15 Id. § 1311(c)(1)(F), 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031(c)(1)(F) (requiring qualified health plans 
to “utilize a uniform enrollment form . . . that takes into account criteria that the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners develops and submits to the Secretary”). 
16 Id. sec. 6603, § 2794, 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-95 (West Supp. 1A 2010). 
17 Id. sec. 10101(f), § 2718(c), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-18(c). 
18 Id. sec. 1001(5), § 2719(4), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-19(4); see also HEALTH CARRIER 
EXTERNAL REVIEW MODEL ACT (Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs 2010), available at 
http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_b_uniform_health_carrier_ext_rev_model_act.pdf. 
19 Id. sec. 3210(a), § 1882(y), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395ss(y). 
20 See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., CMS PRODUCT NO. 02110, CHOOSING 
A MEDIGAP POLICY:  A GUIDE TO HEALTH INSURANCE FOR PEOPLE WITH MEDICARE 11 
(2011), available at http://www.medicare.gov/Publications/Pubs/pdf/02110.pdf (noting 
that the C and F policies cover one-hundred percent of almost all benefits available). 
21 See Letter from Jane Cline, President, Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs, et al. to Kath-
leen Sebelius, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., and Hilda Solis, Sec’y, U.S. 
Dep’t of Labor (Dec. 17, 2010), available at http://www.naic.org/documents/ 
committees_b_consumer_information_ppaca_letter_to_sebelius.pdf (providing “the 
standard definitions and standards for the summary of benefits and coverage” to HHS 
and the Department of Labor). 
22 See Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs, Draft Rate Disclosure Form (May 25, 2010), 
available at http://www.naic.org/documents/index_health_reform_rate_review_final_ 
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creating model statutes for the states.  This task is quite important, since 
PPACA requests that the states implement its regulatory requirements even 
though many states currently lack the explicit authority to enforce federal 
law otherwise.23  The NAIC has, for example, drafted model statutes to im-
plement provisions of the reform law that took effect for plans beginning 
six months after the effective data of PPACA.24 
II.  WHY THE NAIC? 
There are several apparent reasons that the NAIC was given these 
responsibilities under the reform law.  First, the NAIC asked for a role 
in implementing the law.  The NAIC represented to Congress that its 
open and transparent model-law development process was the most 
consumer-friendly approach for implementing PPACA—indeed, that 
the NAIC’s process was superior to the HHS rulemaking process.25  
Congress responded by giving the NAIC a role. 
Second, the NAIC is a natural partner for implementation given 
the role of the states in the reform legislation.  The Senate’s version of 
PPACA, which was ultimately adopted by Congress, creates a partner-
ship between federal and state governments for implementing the leg-
islation.26  As noted above, PPACA asks the states to enact and enforce 
 
rate_filing_summary.pdf; see also PPACA sec. 1003, § 2794, 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-94 (de-
tailing the review process for “unreasonable increases in premiums”).  HHS “reviewed 
and incorporated elements” from this form in developing its own form.  CTR. FOR 
CONSUMER INFO. & INS. OVERSIGHT, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CMS-10379, 
SUPPORTING STATEMENT FOR PAPERWORK REDUCTION SUBMISSION:  RATE INCREASE RE-
VIEW AND DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS 6 (2011), available at http://www.cms.gov/ 
PaperworkReductionActof1995/PRAL/list.asp (search for document serial number 10379). 
23 See Survey on State Authority to Enforce PPACA Immediate Implementation Provisions, 
NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMMISSIONERS & CENTER FOR INS. POL’Y & RES. (Aug. 5, 2010),  
http://www.naic.org/documents/index_health_reform_section_ppaca_state_enforcement
_authority.pdf (surveying state law on PPACA-related enforcement authority). 
24 These include provisions covering adult children up to age twenty-six, internal 
and external review of adverse coverage decisions, preexisting conditions for children, 
lifetime and annual limits on care, and rescissions.  For links to NAIC draft model laws, 
see Committees & Activities:  Regulatory Framework (B) Task Force, NAT’L ASS’N INS. COM-
MISSIONERS & CENTER FOR INS. POL’Y & RES., http://www.naic.org/committees 
_b_regulatory_framework.htm (visited Mar. 15, 2011). 
25 See Letter from Roger A. Sevigny, President, Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs, et al. 
to Max Baucus, Chairman, Senate Fin. Comm. (Sept. 30, 2009), available at  
http://www.naic.org/documents/testimony_0909_officers_to_baucus_healthcare.pdf 
(arguing for the benefits of the NAIC model-law development process). 
26 See Timothy S. Jost, Pro & Con:  State Lawsuits Won’t Succeed in Overturning the In-
dividual Mandate, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1225, 1225 (2010) (noting the Senate bill’s reliance 
on the states for regulation and enforcement).  The House bill, by contrast, would 
JOST REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/4/2011  3:17 PM 
2048 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 159: 2043 
 
PPACA’s insurance reforms and to create the exchanges and risk-
transfer programs.27  But PPACA assigns to the federal government—
more specifically, to HHS—responsibility for adopting regulations to 
implement the law.28  Cooperating and consulting with each of the 
states independently while drafting these regulations would be un-
wieldy.  Furthermore, given the existence of the NAIC, establishing a 
new institutional framework to coordinate state insurance depart-
ments in addressing the technical problems raised by implementation 
of PPACA’s  insurance regulations would be redundant and unrealistic. 
Of course, a number of associations represent the states:  the Na-
tional Council of State Legislatures (NCSL), the National Governors 
Association (NGA), and more immediately relevant, the National 
Council of Insurance Legislators (NCOIL).  The NCSL and NGA, 
however, do not have an established process for drafting model legis-
lation or regulations.  NCOIL does draft model legislation, but has 
less experience with health insurance regulation and less history of 
working with Congress on regulatory issues.29  Although all states are 
considered members of NCOIL, only twenty-eight states are full con-
tributing members.30  The NAIC, by contrast, has an established pro-
gram for drafting model laws and regulations and a structure that 
enables it to draw on state technical staff to work on regulatory is-
sues.31  All states and territories participate fully in its activities.32  It was 
 
have established a national “Health Choices Administration” and would have charged 
this entity with implementing the legislation.  See Affordable Health Care for America 
Act, H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. §§ 241–243 (2009) (detailing the responsibilities of the 
independent agency and its commissioner). 
27 See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text (outlining the general reform provi-
sions as they relate to states). 
28 PPACA § 1321(a)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 18041(a)(1) (West Supp. 1B 2010) (allocat-
ing responsibility for issuing regulations to meet PPACA’s reform requirements to HHS). 
29 NCOIL’s basic approach to Congress is one of confrontation rather than coop-
eration.  See History and Purpose, NAT’L CONF. INS. LEGISLATORS, http://www.ncoil.org/ 
ncoilinfo/about.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2011) (stating that “NCOIL is an adamant, 
vocal opponent of any Congressional initiative” that runs against its organizational goals). 
30 NCOIL Member States, NAT’L CONF. INS. LEGISLATORS, http://www.ncoil.org/ 
ncoilinfo/member.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2011). 
31 See FAQ ,  NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMMISSIONERS & CENTER FOR INS. POL’Y & RES., 
http://www.naic.org/documents/about_faq.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2011) (describ-
ing the process of drafting model laws); Model Law Development Framework:  Frequently 
Asked Questions, NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMMISSIONERS & CENTER FOR INS. POL’Y & RES., 
http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_models_faqs.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 
2011) (setting out the process and criteria for model-law development); Procedures for 
Model Law Development:  Adopted May 2007, Amended September 2008, NAT’L ASS’N INS. 
COMMISSIONERS & CENTER FOR INS. POL’Y & RES., http://www.naic.org/ 
JOST REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/4/2011  3:17 PM 
2011 The NAIC and the Implementation of PPACA 2049 
 
therefore the obvious agent to collectively represent the states in col-
laborating with the federal government to address technical issues 
PPACA raised. 
The technical expertise available to the NAIC is a third advantage 
that it offered for advising HHS on implementation issues.  Prior to 
the adoption of PPACA, HHS had only a handful of staff directly ded-
icated to the regulation of private insurance.33  The NAIC, on the oth-
er hand, had access through its committee and working group struc-
ture to the regulatory staff members of all of the states and territories, 
including skilled actuaries, accountants, and lawyers.34  The regulatory 
staff of HHS has grown dramatically since PPACA’s enactment with 
the creation of the Office of Consumer Information and Insurance 
Oversight (OCIIO).35  The OCIIO has recently been moved to the 
Centers on Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) and renamed the 
Center for Consumer Information and Insurance Oversight 
(CCIIO).36  CCIIO’s expertise is supplemented by resources and 
knowledge already existing in CMS, which oversees Medicare Ad-
 
documents/committees_models_procedures.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2011) (describ-
ing NAIC’s model-law development criteria as well as procedures for developing guide-
lines, the adoption process, and implementing model laws). 
32 See Map of NAIC States & Jurisdictions, NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMMISSIONERS & CEN-
TER FOR INS. POL’Y & RES., http://www.naic.org/state_web_map.htm (last visited Mar. 
15, 2011) (showing that all U.S. states and territories are members of the NAIC). 
33 In 2008, HHS had only four people assigned to enforcement of the insurance 
regulation provisions of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act.  See 
Business Practices in the Individual Health Insurance Market:  Termination of Coverage:  Hear-
ing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 110th Cong. 74-75 (2008) (state-
ment of Abby L. Block, Director, Center for Drug and Health Plan Choice, Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services) (reporting that only four federal officials were re-
sponsible for ensuring that insurers complied with HIPAA “for the entire United States 
of America”). 
34 See Actuarial & Statistical Department, NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMMISSIONERS & CENTER 
FOR INS. POL’Y & RES., http://www.naic.org/actuarial_statistical_dept.htm (last visited 
Mar. 15, 2011) (describing the actuarial and statistical resources available to the 
NAIC); Legal Division, NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMMISSIONERS & CENTER FOR INS. POL’Y & 
RES., http://www.naic.org/legal_home.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2011) (providing an 
overview of resources available through the NAIC’s Legal Division). 
35 See The Office of Consumer Information and Insurance Oversight, U.S. DEPARTMENT 
HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES,  http://www.hhs.gov/ociio/index2.html (last visited Mar. 
15, 2011) (presenting the OCIIO, the new office within HHS created to implement 
PPACA requirements such as enforcing insurance compliance, providing state guid-
ance, and compiling data on insurance options). 
36 About Us, CENTER FOR CONSUMER INFO. & INS. OVERSIGHT, http://cciio.cms.gov/ 
resources/about/index.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2011). 
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vantage and Part D prescription drug plans;37 the Departments of 
Treasury and Labor, which are responsible for regulating employee 
benefit plans;38 and the Office of Personnel Management, which runs 
the Federal Employee Health Benefits Program.39  Nevertheless, the 
responsibility for regulation of private insurance has traditionally re-
sided with the states, which continue to have the most expertise and 
experience with such regulation.40  This was the expertise that the 
NAIC offered the federal government for health reform implementation. 
Federal law has often relied on the technical competence of pri-
vate organizations to shape and implement regulatory policy.  Since its 
inception, the Medicare program has turned to private accreditation 
agencies to establish standards for hospitals and other health care 
providers as well as to certify compliance with these standards.41  Med-
icare and Medicaid also rely on accreditation of managed care organi-
zations.42  The Food and Drug Administration relies on private organi-
zations to inspect facilities where medical devices are manufactured.43 
 
37 See Helen Lee, CMS Oversight, 14 J. MANAGED CARE PHARMACY S22, S22 to S23 
(2008) (describing CMS oversight of these programs). 
38 See PATRICK PURCELL & JENNIFER STAMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34443, 
SUMMARY OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT (ERISA) 1 (2009) 
(noting that the Treasury Department “oversees standards for plan participation, vest-
ing, and funding” and the Labor Department “regulates fiduciary standards and re-
quirements for reporting and disclosure of financial information”). 
39 5 U.S.C. § 8909(a) (2006). 
40 See Letter from Jane Cline, President, Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs, et al. to Nancy 
Pelosi, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives, and Harry Reid, Majority Leader, U.S. 
Senate ( Jan. 6, 2010), available at http://www.naic.org/documents/testimony_ 
100106_health_reform_letter_officers.pdf (noting that “[s]tate insurance regulators have 
extensive experience and expertise in regulating health insurance” and that “[t]hey are 
closer to consumers and have a better understanding of the markets they regulate”). 
41 See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals:  Pri-
vate Regulation of Health Care and the Public Interest, 24 B.C. L. REV. 835, 840-45 (1983) 
(detailing the accreditation procedures of the privately run Joint Commission on Ac-
creditation of Hospitals); Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Medicare and the Joint Commission on 
Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations:  A Healthy Relationship?, LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., Autumn 1994, at 15, 15-17 [hereinafter Jost, Healthy Relationship?] (examining 
Medicare’s reliance on the private Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare 
Organizations to accredit Medicare-financed health services). 
42 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-22(e)(4) (providing that private accredition organizations 
may accredit a Medicare Advantage organization that meets applicable standards); id. § 
1396u-2(c)(2)(B) (allowing states not to duplicate the managed care accreditation re-
quirements of private accrediting organizations). 
43 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-157, MEDICAL DEVICES:  STA-
TUS OF FDA’S PROGRAM FOR INSPECTIONS BY ACCREDITED ORGANIZATIONS 6-9 (2007) (de-
tailing the FDA medical-device accreditation process for private organizations). 
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Private accreditation bodies offer the federal government specia-
lized competence for addressing technical problems, as well as the 
ability to respond quickly and agilely to regulatory problems as they 
arise.44  The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organ-
izations, for example, regularly reviews its accreditation standards and 
updates them much more frequently and rapidly than HHS updates 
its corresponding hospital certification requirements, which are used 
for nonaccredited hospitals.45  Similarly, the NAIC has the capacity, 
through state agency staff, to analyze technical issues competently 
and, when necessary, relatively quickly.46 
III.  THE NAIC PROCESS 
Congress also saw the NAIC as an attractive partner for HHS in 
the implementation of PPACA because of the NAIC’s unusually open 
and participatory administrative process.47  Although the NAIC meets 
together for several days three times a year to carry out its business 
(and occasionally holds interim meetings to address particular issues), 
most of its work is carried out through open conference calls.48  These 
are scheduled as needed, but when a rule is in the process of being 
made, committees can meet once or twice a week for one to three 
hours at a time.  A drafting subgroup, composed of technical staff 
drawn from several state insurance departments, prepares a proposal 
which is circulated to regulators and to “interested parties” who have 
registered for participation in the process.49  The subgroup then 
presents and discusses the proposal on a conference call.  After the 
 
44 See Jost, Healthy Relationship?, supra note 41, at 29-30 (naming cost savings and 
adaptability as reasons that Congress may rely on private accreditation). 
45 See id. at 30-31 (noting that changes in government regulation require both the 
time consuming notice-and-comment process and “prolonged scrutiny from the Office 
of Management and Budget,” which private accreditation companies can avoid). 
46 See sources cited supra note 31. 
47 See Procedures for Model Law Development:  Adopted May 2007, Amended September 
2008, supra note 31 (prescribing NAIC’s process for adopting model laws, which allows 
interested parties to comment via committee).  Much of the following description of 
the NAIC process is based on my personal knowledge gained from my experience as a 
funded consumer representative.  See infra note 54 and accompanying text. 
48 See NAIC Conference Calls & Interim Meetings Calendar, NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMMIS-
SIONERS & CENTER FOR INS. POL’Y & RES., http://www.naic.org/meetings_ 
calendar.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2011) (demonstrating the range of topics and indi-
cating that interested parties may participate in calls). 
49 “Interested parties” are persons or entities, other than regulators, with an inter-
est in the topic under consideration by the NAIC. 
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subgroup has completed its consideration, the call is opened up—first 
to other regulators and then to “interested parties”—and a discussion 
that often involves a number of regulators and interested parties pre-
senting varying perspectives follows.  If an issue is resolved, a draft is 
“exposed,” usually for at least a week, to receive written comments.50  
These written comments, as well as further oral comments, are consi-
dered at the next call. 
Once all issues are resolved, the working group adopts a proposed 
model law or regulation, which is then sent onto the appropriate 
NAIC committee—usually the Health Insurance and Managed Care or 
“B” Committee if health insurance issues are involved51—for revision 
and adoption.  The committee usually considers the proposal on an 
open call with participation by the working group, other regulators, 
and interested parties.  A proposal will finally be voted on by the NAIC 
Executive Committee and the “Plenary,” the full body of all commis-
sioners.  The committees are composed of the commissioners them-
selves, as is the Plenary.52 
“Interested parties” who participate in the process may include in-
surers and their lobbyists and lawyers, but they also may include insur-
ance agents and brokers, who seem to exercise tremendous influence at 
the NAIC.53  Health care providers and vendors of insurance-related 
products and services may also be interested parties, in addition to repre-
sentatives of outside experts like the American Academy of Actuaries.  But 
“interested parties” also include consumer representatives. 
The NAIC is unusual in that it pays the expenses of a number of  
consumer representatives to participate in its deliberations.  Under its 
consumer representation program, initiated in 1992, each year the 
NAIC chooses a number of individuals to serve as “funded” consumer 
 
50 See NAIC Exposure Document Index, NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMMISSIONERS & CENTER 
FOR INS. POL’Y & RES., http://www.naic.org/committees_exposure_drafts.htm (last 
visited Mar. 15, 2011) (displaying the list of the most recent “exposed” documents). 
51 For a list of the NAIC’s committees, see Committees & Activities, NAT’L ASS’N INS. 
COMMISSIONERS & CENTER FOR INS. POL’Y & RES., http://www.naic.org/index_ 
committees.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2011). 
52 See NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, 2011 COMMITTEE LIST 4-11 (2011), available at 
http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_cmtelist.pdf (listing the structure and 
membership of the Plenary and Executive Committees). 
53 See Press Release, Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs, NAIC Names 2010 Consumer 
Liaison Representatives (Mar. 2, 2010), available at http://www.naic.org/Releases/ 
2010_docs/2010_consumer_reps.htm (listing the 2010 funded and unfunded consum-
er representatives). 
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representatives.54  During 2010, when the NAIC fulfilled many of its 
statutory responsibilities under PPACA, eighteen funded consumer 
representatives were chosen, seventeen of whom were able to serve for 
the entire year.55  These consumer representatives may join NAIC con-
ference calls without charge—other interested parties must pay a per-
minute fee—and receive an annual budget to cover the cost of attend-
ing the NAIC’s three annual meetings.56  The NAIC also has a Consum-
er Participation Board of Trustees consisting of six consumer representa-
tives and six commissioners.  This Board selects the other consumer 
representatives, appoints a consumer liaison committee, and represents 
the interests of NAIC consumers.57 
Funded consumer representatives must represent legitimate con-
sumer organizations that cannot cover the costs of consumer partici-
pation and must demonstrate consumer-oriented skills and an exper-
tise in insurance issues.58  During 2010, the consumer representatives 
primarily represented state-based consumer advocacy organizations, 
although some represented national organizations.59  Four, including 
the author, were law professors.60  For 2010, ten additional consumer 
representatives, representing national disease and consumer advocacy 
organizations that could afford to cover their expenses, served as un-
funded consumer representatives.61 
 
54 See Consumer Participation at NAIC, NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMMISSIONERS & CENTER FOR 
INS. POL’Y & RES., http://www.naic.org/consumer_participation.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 
2011) (describing the funded representative program and application process). 
55 See Press Release, Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs, supra note 53.  One of the con-
sumer representatives was hired to work for CCIIO. 
56 Consumer Participation at NAIC, supra note 54. 
57 See Agenda, Executive (Ex) Committee, Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs, attachment 1, § 2 
(Mar. 27, 2010), available at http://www.naic.org/meetings1003/ex_materials.pdf (de-
scribing the structure, election process, and term of service for the NAIC Consumer 
Participation Board). 
58 See 2011 Criteria for Selection, NAIC Funded Consumer Liaison Representatives, NAT’L 
ASS’N INS. COMM’RS & CENTER FOR INS. POL’Y & RES., http://www.naic.org/ 
documents/consumer_participation_funded_con_Criteria.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 
2011) (presenting preferences and qualifications for funded representatives). 
59 See Press Release, Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs, supra note 53 (providing names 
and professions of the funded representatives). 
60 Id. 
61 Id.  For the list of 2011 unfunded representatives, see 2011 NAIC Unfunded 
Consumer Representatives, NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMMISSIONERS & CENTER FOR INS. POL’Y 
& RES., http://www.naic.org/documents/consumer_participation_unfunded_reps.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 15, 2011). 
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At least a dozen of the NAIC consumer representatives have been 
directly and continuously involved in the PPACA implementation 
process.62  The PPACA-mandated task force that was formed under the 
auspices of the NAIC to develop uniform definitions of coverage doc-
uments and other standardized definitions also included several con-
sumer representatives.63  Consumer representatives were present at all 
open meetings discussing implementation of the legislation and on 
the approximately 200 hours of conference calls discussing implemen-
tation issues.  In fact several consumer representatives were usually 
present.  Consumers regularly submitted written comments on draft 
proposals.  These comments typically went through several internal 
drafts and were submitted as a joint product signed by a number of 
consumer representatives.  Consumer advocates were also able to pool 
their resources and hire an actuary to advise them on the technical is-
sues raised by various proposed model laws and rules. 
Public participation in rulemaking and regulation is not, of 
course, unique to the NAIC.  Under the federal Administrative Proce-
dure Act (APA), an agency must publish a proposed rule, accept 
comments on the rule, consider the comments, and publish a final 
rule with a response to the comments.64  Consumer advocates often 
submit comments to agencies.  Attempts have been made in the past to 
fund or to institutionalize consumer advocacy in the rulemaking 
process,65 and public representatives have also played a role in negotiated 
rulemaking.66 
 
62 The details of the consumer-representative process included herein are based 
on my own personal knowledge. 
63 See Attachments to Letter from Jane Cline, President, Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. 
Comm’rs, et al. to Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., and 
Hilda Solis, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Labor (Dec. 17, 2010), available at 
http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_b_consumer_information_ppaca_final_ 
materials.pdf (listing membership of the consumer information subgroup). 
64 See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006) (prescribing the administrative rulemaking process). 
65 See 1 C.F.R. § 305.71-6 (1991) (providing recommendations attempting to bal-
ance meaningful public participation with effective agency performance); Carl Tobias, 
Great Expectations and Mismatched Compensation:  Government Sponsored Public Participation 
in Proceedings of the Consumer Product Safety Commission, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 1101, 1102-10 
(1986) (describing an approach that reimbursed individuals for costs of participating 
in administrative proceedings). 
66 See, e.g., Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Negotiated Rulemaking Before Federal Agencies:  Evalu-
ation of Recommendations by the Administrative Conference of the United States, 74 GEO. L.J. 
1625, 1687-88 (1986) (reporting on “consumer interest representatives’ involvement” 
in an FTC rule revision). 
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But public participation in APA rulemaking is inherently limited.  
Agencies certainly receive input from the public in the rule-drafting 
process.  HHS, for example, solicited public comments very early in its 
process with respect to the various issues raised by PPACA, such as the 
definition of “unreasonable premium increases” or how to implement 
PPACA’s minimum medical-loss ratio requirement.67  A federal agen-
cy, however, may not disclose the contents of a proposed or final rule 
until it is published in the federal register.68  The process allows no 
explicit opportunity for an open give-and-take discussion of regulatory 
alternatives.  Once a proposed rule is issued, moreover, it is often too late 
to alter the rule’s content substantially.69  The NAIC process—in which in-
terested parties are involved at every step of the process—permits much in-
creased public participation. 
Greater public involvement might simply amplify the voice of re-
gulated parties absent the direct involvement of consumers.  Funding 
consumer involvement in a regulatory process, on the other hand, in-
sures that consumer voices are heard.  Most importantly, assuring a 
critical mass of consumer participants in a regulatory process makes it 
much more likely that consumers will actually affect the regulatory 
product.  Regulatory boards often include token consumer represen-
tation, but consumer advocates tend to be outnumbered and their 
voices drowned out.70  A critical mass of consumer advocates is neces-
sary to provide mutual support, develop and articulate ideas and posi-
tions, and avoid burnout.  The NAIC consumer involvement program 
during 2010 achieved these goals. 
 
67 See Medical Loss Ratios, 75 Fed. Reg. 19,297 (Apr. 14, 2010) (to be codified at 
26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590, and 48 C.F.R. pts. 146 & 148) (inviting public 
comments on implementing PPACA’s minimum medical-loss ratio requirement); 
Premium Review Process, 75 Fed. Reg. 19,335 (Apr. 14, 2010) (to be codified at 48 
C.F.R. pts. 146 & 148) (inviting public comments on defining unreasonable premium 
increases); see also Requests for Comment, U.S. DEPARTMENT HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, 
http://www.hhs.gov/ociio/regulations/requests/index.html (last visited Mar. 15, 
2011) (requesting public comments on other health care–related regulatory issues). 
68 See 1 C.F.R. § 17.1 (2010) (explaining that the Office of the Federal Register 
holds documents confidentially until publication). 
69 Although an administrative agency may change a proposed rule before it is fina-
lized, if the rule is changed too substantially, the agency must conduct a second round 
of notice-and-comment rulemaking.  See Chocolate Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. Block, 755 
F.2d 1098, 1104 (4th Cir. 1985) (requiring the agency to be “sufficiently descriptive” 
about potential changes to allow fair comment). 
70 See, e.g., Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The Necessary and Proper Role of Regulation to Assure 
Quality of Health Care, 25 HOUS. L. REV. 525, 584 n.331 (1988) (noting that “[t]he use-
fulness of consumer members of medical boards has been seriously challenged”). 
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IV.  HOW DID THE NAIC CARRY OUT ITS PPACA RESPONSIBILITIES? 
During the spring, summer, and fall of 2010, the NAIC was heavily 
involved in PPACA implementation activities.  It fulfilled its statutory 
duty to establish definitions and methodologies for calculating mini-
mum medical-loss ratios as required by section 10101 of PPACA;71 
convened a task force that developed uniform definitions of coverage 
documents and standardized definitions to implement section 
1001(5);72 and developed a form for insurers to use in justifying un-
reasonable premium increases.73  The NAIC also drafted model laws to 
be used by the states to implement PPACA’s exchange provisions and 
other parts of the Act.74 
As a participant in this process I was struck by several things.  First, 
the NAIC process afforded consumer advocates impressive opportuni-
ties to influence its model laws and regulations.  Consumer represent-
atives participated in each NAIC PPACA implementation initiative 
and had an impact in virtually every instance.  The NAIC Health In-
surance and Managed Care Committee, for example, recommitted a 
draft of the premium increase justification form to the “Speed to Mar-
 
71 See Letter from Jane Cline, President, Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs, et al. to Kath-
leen Sebelius, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. (Oct. 27, 2010), available at 
http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_ex_mlr_reg_asadopted.pdf (transmitting 
the uniform definitions and standard methodologies for calculating minimum-
medical-loss ratios); see also PPACA sec. 10101(f), § 2718(c), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-18(c) 
(West Supp. 1A 2010) (laying out the NAIC’s obligations in establishing minimum 
medical-loss ratios). 
72 See Draft Letter from Mila Kofman, Co-Chair, Consumer Info. Subgroup, and 
Teresa Miller, Co-Chair, Consumer Info. Subgroup, to Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y, U.S. 
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. (Nov. 15, 2010), available at http://www.naic.org/ 
documents/committees_b_consumer_information_101116_docs_for_adoption.pdf (de-
scribing the NAIC’s process of developing the standard definitions and standards for 
summaries of benefits and coverage); see also PPACA sec. 1001(5), § 2715(a), 42 
U.S.C.A. § 300gg-15(a) (providing for NAIC involvement in developing such defini-
tions and standards). 
73 See Rate Filing Disclosure Form (Nov. 10, 2010), available at http:// 
www.naic.org/documents/committees_b_rate_filing_disclosure_form.pdf; see also 
sources cited supra note 22. 
74 These other parts included the early reforms prohibiting preexisting condition 
exclusions, PPACA §§ 1101, 42 U.S.C.A. § 18001 (West Supp. 1B 2010), lifetime and 
annual limits, PPACA secs. 1001(5), 10101(a), § 2711, 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-11 (West 
Supp. 1A 2010), and cost-sharing for preventive services, PPACA sec. 1001(5), § 2713, 
42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-13.  They also included provisions requiring coverage of adult 
children through age twenty-six, id., § 2714, 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-14, and internal ap-
peal (grievance) and external appeal (utilization review) procedures, PPACA secs. 
1001(5), 10101(g), § 2719, 42 U.S.C.A. 300gg-19. 
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ket Task Force” after consumers objected to the abbreviated nature of 
the form, and a much more comprehensive disclosure form emerged 
from the Committee the second time around.  The NAIC Executive 
Committee and Plenary rejected several major changes to the minimum 
medical-loss ratio rule forcefully advocated by industry lobbyists in the 
face of consumer resistance.75  Consumers were able to secure additional 
drafting notes for a number of the framework laws that suggested con-
sumer-friendly provisions that states could add to the implementing laws. 
Second, much has been made in recent decades of the phenome-
non of regulatory capture—the tendency of regulated industries to 
gain influence over their regulators.76  The insurance industry has cer-
tainly been a presence throughout the PPACA-implementation pro-
ceedings and was usually able to bring to bear many more resources 
than were consumers.  Regulators are properly concerned about the 
ongoing solvency of insurers, as, of course, are consumers.  There are 
limits, therefore, as to how far regulators are willing to go in restrict-
ing insurance premium increases.  Brokers and agents, whom the 
NAIC calls “producers,” were also a powerful presence in the NAIC 
proceedings, reflecting their substantial political clout at the state lev-
el.  Like consumers, insurers and other interested parties succeeded 
in securing favorable changes to model laws and regulations.  Howev-
er, the process on the whole was balanced and responsive to consum-
ers as well as insurers.  The insurance industry certainly did not cap-
ture the PPACA NAIC regulatory process. 
Third, given the political battles that shaped PPACA and continue 
to buffet its implementation, the NAIC process was also remarkably 
apolitical.  The commissioners who make up the NAIC are politically 
accountable actors.  Eleven of the state commissioner members are 
directly elected, and most of the remaining commissioners are ap-
pointed by governors.77  The commissioners can bring their states’ pol-
 
75 See generally Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Writing New Rules for Insurers—Progress on the 
Medical Loss Ratio, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1883 (2010) (explaining NAIC’s role in de-
veloping draft regulations to define and calculate PPACA’s minimum medical-loss ra-
tio requirement). 
76 See, e.g., Jean-Jaques Laffont & Jean Tirole, The Politics of Government Decision-
Making:  A Theory of Regulatory Capture, 106 Q.J. ECON. 1089, 1090-95 (1991) (explain-
ing interest group politics via an agency framework); George J. Stigler, The Theory of 
Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 3 (1971) (arguing that “regulation 
is acquired by [an] industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit”). 
77 See State Commissioners—2009, NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMMISSIONERS & CENTER FOR 
INS. POL’Y & RES., http://www.naic.org/documents/members_state_commissioners_ 
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itics to bear on policy development, both through amendments 
adopted at the committee or plenary level and also through instruc-
tions to their staff who participate in the working group process.  
Many of the important decisions during the NAIC’s involvement in 
PPACA’s implementation took place in the fall of 2010 under the 
shadow of an election in which thirty-seven states were electing gover-
nors and four were electing insurance commissioners.78  Many of the 
governors ran in opposition to PPACA.  Twenty-one of the insurance 
commissioner members of the NAIC represented states that sued the 
United States in 2010 to declare parts of PPACA unconstitutional.79  At 
least one state commissioner who ran as a Democrat and who was an 
officer of the NAIC was defeated in her bid for reelection.80  Of 
course, the 2010 election moved the states considerably to the right, 
and whether this development will have an impact on the politics of 
the NAIC remains to be seen. 
Nevertheless, virtually all of the decisions made by the NAIC in 
the PPACA implementation process were unanimous.  A few commis-
sioners made speeches in open meetings criticizing PPACA, while 
others spoke in its favor.  In the end, however, the NAIC followed 
through with its assignments of advising HHS and drafting model laws 
that conformed to PPACA’s requirements, focusing on technical ra-
ther than political concerns.  Attempts to undermine or deviate from 
those requirements were consistently rejected. 
It is quite likely that state politics affected the ultimate results of 
the NAIC process.  Some commissioners supported consumers more 
vocally; some supported industry or producers.  But the working 
groups that drafted the regulations and model acts consisted of state 
 
elected_appointed.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2011) (listing elected and appointed state 
commissioners). 
78 Beyond the Results:  Governors, WASH. POST, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/special/politics/2010-race-maps/governors (last visited Mar. 15, 2011); see also Elec-
tion Will Mean New Faces in Insurance Commissioner Jobs, INS. J. (Nov. 1, 2010), 
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2010/11/01/114513.htm (noting 
that eleven insurance commissioners are directly elected nationwide, and four elec-
tions were held in November 2010). 
79 See Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 10-0091, 
2011 WL 285683, at *1 n.1 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011) (naming the twenty-five states that 
joined Florida in challenging PPACA’s constitutionality); Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. 
Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 770-71 (E.D. Va. 2010) (noting that Virginia brought suit 
to challenge the “Minimum Essential Coverage Provision” of PPACA). 
80 See Election 2010:  Oklahoma, N.Y. TIMES, http://elections.nytimes.com/2010/ 
results/oklahoma (last visited Mar. 15, 2011) (displaying a map of election results). 
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technical staff rather than political appointees.  By the time the regu-
latory products reached the commissioners, they had already been vet-
ted through a largely apolitical, open, and participatory process.  
Once the drafting process was completed and recommendations were 
sent to the commissioners, there was considerable momentum to ab-
ide by the process and refuse changes that were obviously motivated 
by politics.  Politics, therefore, largely remained in the background, and 
the model laws and regulations that emerged from the process seemed to 
be driven more by a desire to implement the law faithfully and in a tech-
nically manageable manner than to score political points. 
Finally, the NAIC process represents a striking example of the po-
tential power of the rule of law.  PPACA has not proved to be a univer-
sally popular law; although results vary from survey to survey, most 
opinion polls find that a significant number of Americans oppose the 
law or support its repeal.81  The law is particularly unpopular in conserv-
ative states, as illustrated by the substantial majorities favoring antireform 
initiatives.82  But PPACA is federal law, and under our constitutional 
system the federal law is the supreme law of the land, binding on state 
officials.83  Throughout NAIC’s involvement in the PPACA implemen-
tation process, the regulators involved seemed resolved to implement 
the law as best they could interpret it.  Whether regulators personally 
believed it was good law or good politics rarely became an issue as the 
NAIC implementation process proceeded. 
Of course, many of PPACA’s provisions must still be implemented 
by the states.  The states may or may not enact the model laws recom-
mended by the NAIC, and even states that follow the NAIC models 
may or may not enforce these laws effectively.  Implementation of the 
exchanges is likely to be particularly contentious.  But the NAIC 
process has addressed and will continue to address many of the tech-
nical issues that the states must confront in implementing the law and 
 
81 See, e.g., Amanda Gardner, Like Congress, Americans Split over Health-Care Reform, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Dec. 6, 2010), http://www.businessweek.com/lifestyle/ 
content/healthday/646927.html (reporting November 2010 polling data showing that 
twenty-eight percent supported repealing PPACA, thirty-one percent supported main-
taining it, and twenty-nine percent were undecided). 
82 Ballot issues opposing health care reform have been passed in Arizona, Mis-
souri, and Oklahoma.  Richard Cauchi, State Legislation and Actions Challenging Certain 
Health Reforms, 2010–2011, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/ 
?tabid=18906 (last updated Mar. 29, 2011). 
83 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“[T]he Laws of the United States . . . shall be the 
supreme Law of the Land.”). 
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has moved the law one step closer to implementation.  The NAIC also 
provides a model for the states to follow as they carry out their obliga-
tions under PPACA—focusing on the practical problems presented by 
implementation rather than political rhetoric; effectively involving all 
interested parties in implementation, including consumers; and attempt-
ing in good faith to follow rather than undermine the law. 
CONCLUSION 
The NAIC asked Congress for a role in implementing PPACA.  
Congress granted the NAIC’s request, but by giving the NAIC authori-
ty, Congress also entrusted the NAIC with responsibility.  On the 
whole, the NAIC has respected the trust Congress placed in it and car-
ried out its assigned tasks faithful to that trust.  The unfolding result is 
a regulatory product that has increased the likelihood that PPACA will 
make a positive change in the American health care financing system. 
 
 
